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Abstract
People exaggerate the extent to which their information is shared with others. This
paper introduces the concept of such information projection and provides a simple but
widely applicable model. The key application describes a novel agency conict in a
frictionless learning environment. When monitoring with ex-post information, biased
evaluators exaggerate how much experts could have known ex-ante and underestimate
experts on average. Experts, to defend their reputations, are too eager to base predic-
tions on ex-ante information which substitutes for the information jurors independently
learn ex-post, and too reluctant to base predictions on ex-ante information which comple-
ments the information jurors independently learn ex-post. Instruments which mitigate
Bayesian agency conicts are either ine¤ective or directly backre. Applications to de-
fensive medicine are discussed.
Keywords: Biased Beliefs, Asymmetric Information, Hindsight Bias, Monitoring, De-
fensive Medicine.
1 Introduction
Economic analysis commonly assumes that people understand the extent to which their
information is private. Evidence from several important domains shows however that people
systematically mispredict informational di¤erences. In particular, people too often think
as if others knew what they did, and too often act as if others could guess their private
information correctly.
Investigations after accidents such as the collapse of Space Shuttle Challenger in 86 
not only collect novel information about what went wrong, but cause people to exaggerate
how easy it would have been to predict the tragedy ex-ante. Given the ex-post information,
it is possible to understand how NASA o¢ cials should have interpreted ex-ante facts in a
way to avoid the disaster. What many investigators then typically fail to fully appreciate is
that such insights are only possible in hindsight.
The same mistake is prevalent in communication: speakers are cursed by their expertise
and exaggerate how much of their information on a subject is shared with their audiences.
As a result, software engineers design interfaces, manufacturers provide user-manuals and
professors discuss material in ways that their intended audiences nd too hard to follow.
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To understand such behavior more carefully, this paper introduces a simple but widely
applicable model of such information projection: people are aware of informational di¤erences
but project their private information, exaggerating the extent to which others have access
to the content of their private information.
Section 3 of the paper presents the model. I consider a general environment where people
receive signals about an underlying state privately. Having observed a signal s, a person
exaggerates the probability with which others have also observed the content of this signal.
A person who projects information in this fashion fails to appreciate the extent to which
others need to think and act without the information she has. Through a clear identifying
property, the model ties together a set of empirically well-documented social mispredictions
hindsight bias (Fischho¤, 1975), curse-of -knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber,
1989) or the illusion of transparency (Gilovich, Medvec and Savitsky 1998) and provides a
framework to study their consequences in a unied manner.
The main application of the model is to the classic problem of performance evaluation.
Examples are ubiquitous: corporate boards need to learn about the talent of CEOs, gov-
ernments about the e¤ectiveness of their intelligence agencies or their police force, patients
about the quality of physicians etc. I show that information projection here gives rise to a
novel form of agency conict. Biased evaluators using ex-post information will underestimate
the quality of experts. Experts in turn will have incentives to engage in specic defensive
practices.
To illustrate this agency conict, consider a medical example. Radiologists di¤er in skill;
even when all have access to the same radiograph, the best ones hardly ever miss a tumor
when it is visible on the X-ray while bad ones often do. Initially, all radiologist recommend
a treatment based on an ambiguous X-ray s0. Once the recommendation is adopted and
results are in, an evaluator reviews the case.
The evaluator now has access to information s1 which was unavailable ex-ante: interim
medical outcomes are realized and new X-rays are ordered. A small tumor is typically di¢ cult
to spot on an initial X-ray. When the location of a major tumor is known ex-post, however,
all radiologists have a much better chance of nding the small one on the original X-ray. A
biased evaluator thinks as if such ex-post information had already been available ex-ante.
By projecting this information, the evaluator is thus too surprised when observing that the
treatment failed and too often interprets a success to be the norm. Hence she underestimates
the radiologists competence on average.
Evidence from law and medicine suggests that professionals do fear such underestimation
and respond to it strategically. In medicine, the fear of the retrospectroscope refers to
exactly such anticipation. To describe the possible strategic responses, lets return to the
medical example. In addition to the X-ray, the radiologist now has to decide what other
tests s00 to run. He knows that independent of his choice evaluators will learn some novel
information s1 ex-post. How does the anticipation that evaluators will project s1 when
assessing his competence ex-post alter the radiologists incentives to produce an additional
test ex-ante?
An ex-ante test substitutes for the evaluators ex-post information if knowing its outcome
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decreases how much additional information s1 reveals ex-post. A second MRI on a broken
bone contributes less to a successful diagnosis than the rst one. If ordering an MRI ex-post
is a likely event, the radiologist will have an incentive to order an MRI ex-ante even if the
initial X-ray would have been medically su¢ cient. In this manner, physicians might take
too many biopsies, expose patients to too much radiation, or recommend surgery too often
so that their ex-ante predictions appear less incompetent in hindsight.
An ex-ante test instead complements the ex-post information if knowing s00 increases how
much additional information s1 reveals ex-post. Suppose a social worker can make a valuable,
but still ambiguous, phone call to a foster family. Evaluators will ultimately always learn
whether a child was injured, but this can only conrm child abuse once combined with the
content of the ex-ante phone call. Ironically, the social worker will enjoy a higher professional
reputation if she does not make the phone call ex-ante. In this manner, engineers will be
reluctant to record equivocal forecasts of catastrophes, and physicians will be reluctant to
order vague radiological charts if they fear that ex-post biased evaluators will interpret these
pieces of information as clean ex-ante evidence.
The above responses describe an agency conict where increased ex-post scrutiny or
stronger reputational incentives induce agents to distort the composition of the ex-ante pro-
duced information from complement to substitute signals. Solutions that correct for standard
agency conicts are either ine¤ective or may directly backre. Instead, limiting monitoring
can help restore e¢ ciency. I specify conditions under which reputations formed on the ba-
sis of monitoring successful cases more intensely than failed cases mitigate a radiologists
incentives to engage in the above defensive practices.
The predictions of the model are consistent with evidence from defensive medicine, de-
ned as medical practices adopted to minimize false liability rather than maximize cost-
e¤ective health care. Studdert et al. (2005) show, that to protect their reputation, a vast
majority of physicians engage in both the over-production and under-production of skill-
intensive medical tests. Kessler and McClellan (1996, 2000) show that weaker liability pres-
sure lowers medical costs but not the over-all quality of care, and that this occurs primarily
through changes in diagnostic practices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes evidence for the model which
is presented in Section 3. Sections 4 describes the agency conict. Section 5 discusses the
robustness of the results and how selective monitoring can help mitigate this conict. Section
6 provides a second application of the model to communication. Here the model provides a
rationale for the use of communication protocols to improve information transmission and
fairness at the workplace. Section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence
In this Section, I review evidence from both the lab and the eld. The source of the in-
formational asymmetry is greatly varied across the studies and while individual studies are
subject to multiple interpretations, the sum-total of the evidence provides a compelling case
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for the model.1
Informational asymmetries are inevitable when people learn over time. Here projection
bias implies that those exposed to superior information in the present exaggerate how well
others in the past could have predicted their current information. In a between-subject
design, Fischho¤ (1975) showed that no matter which outcome of an uncertain event was
reported ex-post, this signicantly increased how likely people thought that this event would
occur ex-ante. Such hindsight bias is the most widely documented mistake in the judgment
literature. Hundreds of studies using various paradigms and debiasing techniques provide
overwhelming support for Fischho¤s original ndings. For recent surveys see Rachlinski
(1998) or Guilbault et al. (2004).
A signicant number of studies with professionals conrm the prevalence of hindsight bias
outside the lab. Among many others, Arkes et al. (1981) document signicant hindsight
bias in a sample of 75 practicing physicians. In a study with 121 anesthesiologists judging
actual medical cases, Caplan et al. (1991) document the bias in ruling ex-ante negligence.
In law, Anderson et al. (1997) demonstrate strong e¤ects with practicing judges, and Hastie
et al. (1999) show dramatic hindsight bias with jury eligible citizens. Baron and Hersey
(1988) demonstrate the same e¤ect when the ex-post information is simply the outcome of
an objective lottery and the ex-ante choice is between monetary gambles.
Simultaneous exchanges are also ripe with informational asymmetries and evidence con-
rms projection in these domains as well. Newton (1990) provides an illustrative study in
the context of communication. Subjects were randomly assigned to be tappers or listeners.
Tappers privately picked a song from a public list and tapped out its rhythm in front of
the listeners. Out of the 120 songs tapped, listeners correctly identied only 2:5%. After
tapping, tappers were asked to predict these odds and the mean prediction was around 50%:
Information projection here explains a twenty-fold overestimation. Informed bystanders who
knew the selected song, but only listened to the tapping, also vastly overestimated the success
rate (Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000), while uninformed bystanders did not, (Keysar and
Henly, 2002). The same e¤ects were established in direct verbal communication, (Keysar
and Henly, 2002), and email communication, (Kruger et al., 2005).
The quality of the tappers action directly a¤ects informational di¤erences in these ex-
periments, but evidence suggests that people project private information in exchanges where
di¤erences are xed and people do not need to judge the quality of information transmission.
In a study by Loewenstein, Moore and Weber (2006), subjects had to spot the di¤erence
between two pictures. They were divided into three groups: an uninformed group with sub-
jects who received no further information, an informed group with subjects who were told
the di¤erence, and a third group with subjects who could choose to learn the di¤erence for
a fee. In all treatments, subjects had to guess the fraction of people who would correctly
identify the di¤erence in the uninformed condition. Subjects were paid for the accuracy of
their predictions.
The true fraction was 20%. As Figure 1 indicates, informed subjects greatly overesti-
mated this fraction relative to uninformed subjects. A signicant proportion of subjects
1For a more extensive discussion of the evidence, see Madarász (2009).
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Figure 1: Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2006).
paid to learn the di¤erence, producing more biased estimates (55% versus 30%) and hence
systematically lowered their earnings. Thus people not only acted as if they projected their
private information, but also paid for information that only biased their judgments.2
In the context of nancial markets, Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) provide
support for information projection. Subjects traded assets via a double-oral auction in
two distinct markets. In the rst, subjects were only told the past performance of the
traded companies and asset returns were determined by current performance. In the second,
subjects learned actual earnings as well, but here asset returns were determined by the prices
established in the rst market. The prices in the second market were biased by 30% towards
the actual earnings and individual judgments were biased by 60%: Traders with a smaller
bias traded more aggressively, as if anticipating the bias of others. Camerer (1992) also a
precursor to LMW  conrmed the ndings of CLW, but showed that some subjects learned
to avoid biasing information. When traders had the option to bid for extra information, bids
started high, but converged to zero after a few repetitions. A few subjects even bid negative,
indicating some awareness of potential information projection that is hard to reverse or resist.
Finally, a set of other psychological mispredictions indicates that people project private
information about their internal states as well. Gilovich, Medvec and Savitsky (1998, 2000)
show that people greatly overestimate the probability that their emotions are detected by
others or that their lies, once made, will be discovered.
2.1 Related Literature
To the best of my knowledge, the current paper is the rst to introduce a model of infor-
mation projection. The closest to my paper is the study of CLW (1989) who introduce an
incomplete model of anchoring to explain their data. Although both their model of anchored
expectations and the model of information projection explain these specic results, anchored
expectations are generally inconsistent with information projection. A person who is an-
chored to his own beliefs would typically violate information projection and vice versa. I
2Similar results were established for non-visual tasks such as the solution of a logical puzzle. To control
for curiosity, LMW told subjects that they would learn the solution to the logical and visual puzzles at the
end of the experiment.
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formally demonstrate this in the Appendix.
Biais and Weber (2009) complete the anchoring approach of CLW and o¤er a model of
intrapersonal hindsight bias. There people correctly remember the variance of their past
beliefs but misremember the mean. The authors specify conditions under which this leads to
under-reacting to nancial news and o¤er empirical support using investment bankers from
London and Frankfurt. Mangelsdor¤ and Weber (1998) also follow the anchoring approach of
CLW and provide a formal example of hindsight bias in the context where an agent chooses
between binary lotteries.3
This paper also complements a recent literature on limited strategic reasoning in Bayesian
games, (Eyster and Rabin, 2005), (Koessler and Jehiel, 2008). In these models, peoples aver-
age beliefs are correct and people predict information di¤erences correctly, but fail to appreci-
ate how much others condition their actions on their true private information. More broadly,
this paper also relates to cognitive hierarchy approaches to strategic thinking, (Camerer, Ho
and Chong, 2004) or (Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri 2010), where people have simpli-
ed models of the depth of reasoning by others.
3 Model
Consider an environment where people privately observe signals about the payo¤-relevant
state ! 2 
. A signal is a function from the nite set of states to the set of lotteries over a
realization space, sj : 
 ! Z. Signals are interpreted given a common prior 0 over the
state space. There are N signals and M people. Person ks actual information is the set of
signals Sk whose realizations she knows. The set of all possible information sets is N which
is the power set of N:
To characterize the distribution of information, let pkj 2 (0; 1] denote the initial probability
that person k observes the realization of signal sj . Let us collect these probabilities over
signals and across people into a vector p = ffpkj gNj=1gMk=1: This vector p describes the true
distribution of information in the environment. Each sub-vector pk = fpkj gNj=1 is a probability
distribution over N. An unambiguous increase in persons k information is a change in the
sub-vector pk which weakly increases each of its components. In turn, the informational
environment can be summarized by the tuple   = f
; ; fsjgNj=1; pg.
3.1 Denition
The vector p determines the true distribution of signals and corresponds to rational expec-
tations. Information projection introduces a bias in these expectations. A biased person
exaggerates the probability that the signals whose realizations she knows are also in the
information set of others. I introduce a parameter  2 [0; 1] to express the degree of such
mistaken information projection.
Denition 1 Person k with information set Sk exhibits information projection of degree
3Camerer and Malmendier (2007) also argue about the importance of attribution errors in organizations
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 > 0 if her perception of person i0s information distribution is given by pi() where
pij() = (1  )pij +  if sj 2 Sk and pij() = pij if sj =2 Sk (1)
By projecting information, a person misperceives the distribution of information. Under
full information projection,  = 1, a person believes that all the information she knows is
shared with others. In the case of partial information projection, 0 <  < 1, she believes
that the probability that her information is available to others is between the truth and the
full projection case. Finally,  = 0 corresponds to correct expectations.4 Some remarks are
in order:
 The degree of projection in above is uniform across signals. This is for notational
simplicity only and the model immediately extends to heterogenous projection. There,
the degree of projection is a vector, rather than a scalar. Formally, if kj is the degree to
which person k projects signal j, then collecting these terms into a vector k is person
ks generalized degree of projection. Here an increase in the bias is an increase in any
component of this vector. All results extend to heterogenous projection.
 The denition is formulated without explicit reference to time. If a di¤erent identity
is assigned to the past or future selves of person i, then the denition claims that a
biased person projects her current information onto the past or future selves of person
i. Thus a biased person exaggerates the extent to which person i has observed the
content of her information in the past or that he will know/remember her information
in the future.
 The denition adopts a simple linear form, but it is su¢ cient to assume that pij()
continuously increases in  in the interval [pij ; 1]:Any functional form which satises
this will lead to the same predictions as those described in this paper.
 While the literal meaning of the denition is that people exaggerate the probability
that others observe their signals, in a more general interpretation people exaggerate the
probability that the information content of their signals is reected in the information
available to others. Here projecting information is not a false belief about how public
information transmission is but rather the extent to which ones own views are the
reection of truly private information.
 It is both intuitive and psychologically realistic that some types of information are more
likely to be projected than others. While the model provides no a prior predictions on
the degree to which a particular piece of information is subject to projection relative
to another piece, it provides a potentially useful framework to establish such claims
4The model can be extended by allowing p to depend on the state ! and hence to be state-dependent
random variables rather than state-independent parameters. In this formulation, p(!) is a projectors updated
belief about the distribution of information after receiving signals. The denition then can be applied to this
updated vector pi(!) in the same way as above. The model thus can be interpreted as one where people have
heterogenous priors. Importantly though, relative to postulating the existence of heterogenous priors with no
theory of the way these priors will be heterogenous, the current model makes clear directional predictions on
peoples conicting estimates as a function of the true informational environment.
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empirically. Importantly, for the purposes of this paper, the way in which information
di¤erences in   are partitioned into di¤erent signals will matter neither for the key
properties of the model nor for the main results derived in the context of the applica-
tions. As I show this in Section 3.3, both of these will depend only on the fact that
  0.
3.2 A Dinner Party
To illustrate the model, I turn to a simple example. Tanya is invited for dinner. Alex is
her host and either prepares sh or meat. If Alex is kind, his goal is to prepare Tanyas
favorite. If selsh or unkind, he cares only about his own taste. Tanya and Alex know their
own tastes, but not the other partys. Initially, Alex is equally likely to be kind or selsh
and independently, he is equally likely to prefer sh or meat.
Alex privately receives a noisy signal about Tanyas taste. This signal conveys her true
preference over sh and meat 23 of the time, and the false one
1
3 of the time. The table below
summarizes the inferences of a Bayesian and a fully biased Tanya.
Bayesian,  = 0 Fully biased,  = 1
1(kind j x = right dish) = 2=3+2=32=3+1+2=3 = 47 1+11+1+1 = 23
1(kind j x = wrong dish) = 1=3+1=31=3+1+1=3 = 25 01 = 0
E1(kind) =
7
1247+ 51225 = 12 71223 = 718
Tanya makes two types of inferential mistakes: over-inference and underestimation. First,
she overinfers kindness when served the meal she likes, and hostility when served the meal
she dislikes. Second, Tanya underestimates Alexs kindness on average.
To understand the rst e¤ect, note that Tanya wrongly believes that Alex knows her
taste for sure. She thus too often concludes that good intentions result in good outcomes
and bad intentions in bad outcomes, and as a result, misattributes di¤erences in tastes to
di¤erences in social intentions. On average, she attributes too much kindness to Alex if the
two have the same taste, and too much hostility to Alex if their tastes di¤er. Numerically,
 = 0  = 1
E1(kind j similar taste) = 56  47 + 16  25 = 1935 56  23 = 59
E1(kind j di¤erent taste) = 13  47 + 23  25 = 1635 13  23 = 29
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To understand the second e¤ect, note that the two overinference distortions dont cancel
each other out. The excess negative attribution is always larger than the excess positive
attribution. Since a biased Tanya exaggerates how often a kind Alex serves the right dish,
she expects to be served the dish she likes too often and underestimates Alexs kindness
on average. Such underestimation is a key mechanism for this paper. Similar calculations
show that because Tanya also exaggerates how often Alex serves the right dish if their tastes
coincide, she also underestimates the similarity their tastes an average.
In short, Tanya misattributes di¤erences in tastes to di¤erences in social intentions and
underestimates both the kindness and the similarity of Alex on average. While the ex-ante
expected Bayesian posterior is uniform, the biased one is fks = 736 ; kd = 736 ; us = 736 ; ud =
15
36g. Tanya and Alex might then too often depart as foes rather than friends.
3.3 Information and Underestimation
Lets return to the denition. As mentioned before, a key identifying property of the model is
determined alone by the claim that  > 0. Below I show that this is true because, independent
of further details of the informational environment, by exaggerating the probability that Alex
observes her signals, Tanya exaggerates how much Alex knows about the state. To make
the above statement precise, suppose Alex maximizes a bounded and state-dependent von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over a nite action-set given information S  N.
Formally, his expected payo¤ is:
u(S) = max
y
E[uA(y; !) j S] (2)
Since Alex may receive signals privately, from Tanyas perspective u(S) is a random
variable distributed over N. A rational Tanya has correct beliefs about this distribution. A
fully biased Tanya instead wrongly believes that Alex maximizes his expected utility after
combining the signals he truly observes with whatever signals she observes. Since more
information always allows one to achieve a greater expected utility, Tanya misperceives this
distribution and exaggerates how well Alex can achieve his objectives.
Let (u) 2 N be a privately informed -biased Tanyas belief about the distribution
of Alexs expected payo¤. The next result shows that a biased Tanya always exaggerates
Alexs expected payo¤ and this exaggeration is increasing in her information.
Lemma 1 For all p, (u) rst-order stochastically dominates 0(u) if  > 0. If p = bp
except that pTanya  bpTanya, then (u) fosd b(u) for all  > 0.
This lemma helps identify the model.5 First, it shows that greater information projection
leads to a greater exaggeration of a projectees payo¤. Second it shows that holding a
projectors bias constant, increasing a projectors information leads to greater exaggeration.
Since the comparative static is based purely on increasing the projectors information, the
5The proof of this lemma is an application of the classic result of Blackwell (1953) on the comparison of
information sets. While Blackwell (1953) o¤ers only a partial ordering of information sets, the above result
shows that misperceptions induced by information projection can be ordered by his criterion.
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above result depends neither on the details of how information is distributed nor on how
informational di¤erences are partitioned into signals. Specic restrictions on the environment
 , motivated by economic or psychological considerations, might be imposed on the signal
structure and such restrictions will enrich the predictions of the model, but will not change
the above result.6
Lemma 1 is useful to establish a general consequence of information projection to inference
problems. In the dinner example, Tanya underestimated both the kindness and the similarity
of Alex. To establish a similar result more generally, I consider a slightly more abstract setup.
A reader not interested in a more abstract treatment can simply skip the analysis below. I
re-state the relevant insights and provide intuition in the context of the applications.
Suppose Alexs type is drawn from   R given a continuous prior 0(): His preferences
may again depend on his type, but the set of signals he observes do not. Alexs action y
results in an outcome x 2 X  R where X is nite. Tanya observes only x, but both Alex
and Tanya might have private information about the state !:
I impose two assumptions on the distribution of the outcome. First, the dependence of
the outcome distribution on Alexs type and information can be su¢ ciently expressed by a
set of conditional distribution functions
(x j ; u(S)) :  R! X
where u(S) is Alexs expected payo¤ integrated over his type-dependent expected payo¤s
using the prior 0(). Although this one-dimensional dependence of the outcome on Alexs
information may seem restrictive, because observing more signals implies a higher expected
utility for all types, monotone changes in information will a¤ect u in a monotone man-
ner as well. Furthermore, as Lemma 1 showed, information projection causes a monotone
misperception of the value of Alexs information in maximizing his payo¤. Second, the out-
come process (x j ; u(S)) satises the monotone-likelihood ratio property in  and in the
quantity u. The formal denition is adopted from Milgrom (1981).
Condition 1 A set of densities (x j ; u(S)) satises MLRP in  if for all p and all  > 0
and x > x0;
(x j )
(x0 j ) >
(x j 0)
(x0 j 0) (3)
where for a xed , (x j ) = Ep[(x j ; u(S))]. The analogous condition holds for all
u > u0:
The next result shows that if the above assumptions are satised, Tanyas expected
inference about Alexs type is decreasing in her bias. This result uses Lemma 1, which allows
me to express the consequences of information projection in terms of Tanyas exaggeration
of the distribution of u.
6 In the Appendix, I show that this robust exaggeration of how much a projectee knows distinguishes my
model from the earlier incomplete anchoring approaches adopted by CLW (1989) because anchoring-based
approaches are generically inconsistent with this property of my model.
10
Theorem 1 For all 0(), Ep[

1()] decreases in  in the sense of fosd where expectations
are taken with respect to the true distribution of signals. If p = bp except that pT  bpT , then
Ep[

1()] fosd Ebp[1()] for all  > 0.
Since both more information and higher types shift the distribution of outcomes upwards,
by exaggerating Alexs information, Tanya expects a higher outcome distribution than she
should. This way, she is too surprised observing outcomes below any particular level. She
always overweighs how much information low outcomes reveal and hence underweighs how
much high outcomes reveal about Alexs type. As long as higher types increase the outcome
distributions more, she underestimates Alexs type on average.
Above, I assumed that a higher outcome is good news about Alexs quality . Since
the results depend only on the monotonicity assumption, when a higher outcome is bad
news about  in the sense of Milgrom (1981) a biased observer will overestimate  on
average, and when x is neutral about ; no average misestimation is implied by information
projection.
3.4 Substitute and Complement Information
Key comparative statics of the model will depend on how the value of the projected in-
formation relates to Alexs true information. I introduce an important distinction between
complement and substitute information. I call two signals substitutes if the additional value
of one decreases once the other is know. I call two signals complements if the opposite is
true.
Suppose one needs to nd a house in London. The street address and the full post code
are substitute signals. In contrast, the latitude and the longitude coordinates of its location
are complements. Only once both are know, does one have a reasonable chance of nding it.
Denition 2 Given u(!; y), two signals sl and sj are substitutes if u(sl [ sj)   u(sj) <
u(sl)  u(;) and complements if u(sl [ sj)  u(sj) > u(sl)  u(;). 7
Finally, people may anticipate the bias of others. Let the probability density function
 i;k() 2  [0; 1] describe the beliefs of person i about how much person k 6= i projects
information. If  i is not concentrated on 0, person i believes that there is a non-zero
probability that person k is biased.
4 Defensive Agency
A supervisor evaluates an agent whose task involves processing information. To x ideas, a
radiologist receives a noisy X-ray s0, or set of radiographs S0, on the condition of the patient
! and is asked to recommend a treatment y: A state- and action-dependent stochastic process
(x j !; y), leads to a success xS or a failure xF .
7Since information need not be continous, the appropriate denitions are in terms of super - and sub-
modularity. On the presence of non-concavities in the value of information see e.g., Radner and Stiglitz
(1984).
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Radiologists di¤er in skill. A radiologists ability to interpret the X   ray correctly
depends on his type  2 [0; 1] distributed according to 0. I assume that for any xed set of
ex-ante radiographs S0, a higher type can identify the true state more often and that adding
a signal to S0 weakly increases this probability for all types.8
The evaluator observes the realization of x along with some novel information s1 about !.
The evaluator uses all her information to learn about the radiologisttalent. Since observing
an outcome, particularly whether a treatment failed or succeeded, typically provides plenty
novel medical information about the patient, this assumption is both natural and very weak.
Furthermore, since the outcome process is state-dependent, in the standard Bayesian setting,
this helps the evaluator to form better estimates of . Lets denote the evaluators ex-post
assessment by 1
To close the model, I assume that the radiologist prefers a higher reputation to a lower and
thus maximizes an increasing function of the evaluators posterior b(1), where b(1)  b(01)
whenever 1 fosd 01. If this is commonly known, then in the e¢ cient Bayesian equilibrium
of this game, the radiologist o¤ers a recommendation y which maximizes the probability of
success given his beliefs about the patient 1,
y 2 argmax
Y
E1 [(xS j !; y)] (4)
and given her beliefs about ! and the distribution of information, the evaluator updates her
assessment of  via Bayes rule.
4.1 Monitoring and Reputations
A Bayesian evaluator uses s1 only to learn more about the ex-ante task. A biased evaluator
also projects s1 and exaggerates the ex-ante probability of success for all types. I call the
proportional exaggeration of this probability for a specic type the value of the information
gap for this type. Formally, given Eq.(4):
g =
(xs j ; s0; s1)
(xs j ; s0)
with g being the probabilistic average of g given the prior on types. The rst result is a
direct application of Theorem 1 to binary outcomes.
Proposition 1 For all 0, expected reputation Ex[

1 ] is decreasing in  and in g in the
sense of fosd.
Since a biased evaluator exaggerates the ex-ante probability of success for all types, she
overweighs the information revealed by a failure, and hence underestimates the radiologists
competence on average.
8A simple example is where  is the probability that the radiologist correctly understands the content of
s0. Another is where it is the probability that the agent identies the correct interpretation of di¤erent pieces
of ex-ante evidence under binding time constraints. In devising a successful military response for example,
the ability to sort information quickly is key.
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The above result is true for all priors, hence long-run underestimation holds a fortiori.
The next examples illustrate the comparative static results with respect to the value of the
projected information, i.e., the information gap g.
In-depth Monitoring Obtaining additional signals about the true state of the world
 the nature of the ex-ante task  leads to lower reputations on average. Knowing more
about what happened during the collapse of Challenger allows investigators to determine
the correct interpretation of the ex-ante evidence. More intensive monitoring translates into
lower valuations on average.
Scapegoating after Scandals The above logic implies that launching an investigation
against a person too easily turns this person into a scapegoat. The more the public learns
about an alleged corruption case or a sex-scandal of a politician, the more likely it is that
the public will think that she had poor judgement or character in the past. If one group of
people (such as a salient minority group) is subject to more scrutiny than another, biased
observers will ascribe worse qualities to the minority than to the majority.
Favoritism Similarly, information projection provides an endogenous mechanism for
favoritism. A fair-minded supervisor has to rank workers based on cognitive skill and dis-
cipline alone. Her instructions will more easily be understood by a worker who shares the
supervisor linguistic background than by a worker with a greater information gap such is
an immigrant or a worker who speaks a di¤erent dialect.9 By projecting information the
supervisor misattributes the di¤erences in linguistic backgrounds to di¤erences in talent, and
perceives the foreign worker as less focused and less talented.
While favoritism is typically explained as an exogenous preference of a supervisor for
one worker over another, (Prendergast and Topel 1996), the model of information projection
describes a di¤erent channel. Favoritism towards similartypes here arises endogenously as
a function of the di¤erences in information gaps. Furthermore, such favoritism is unintended.
The same logic implies that fair treatment can mistakenly appear as favoritism. It is
commonplace for investigations into questionable police shooting and episodes in war to
yield results in which internal investigations nd no wrongdoing. The cops and military
investigators presumably can appreciate the ex ante perspective better (i.e. they realize
how di¢ cult it could be to predict whether a person or enemy has a weapon or presents a
threat, or is a combatant or civilian), but to hindsight-biased outsiders it appears exactly
like favoritism.
4.2 Attributing Luck and Skill
I now turn to the impact of information projection on conditional rather than average as-
sessments. Conditional assessments matters in understanding short and medium-run per-
formance di¤erences: whether evaluators attribute these to luck or skill. The results here
depend on the type of the ex-post information revealed by monitoring. If knowing the pro-
jected ex-post information ex-ante would have helped higher types more than lower ones,
evaluators misattribute di¤erences in luck to skill and over-infer skill from performance.
When the reverse is true, evaluators misattribute di¤erences in skill to di¤erences in luck.
9 In Section 6 of the paper I derive a related example formally.
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Proposition 2 If g is increasing in , then 

1( j xS) is increasing in  in the sense of
fosd. If g is decreasing in , then 

1( j xS) is decreasing in  in the sense of fosd.
Over-inference In many professional settings, additional information helps higher types
more. An additional radiograph helps a well-trained radiologist more than it helps a quack.
A careful CEO can adjust a companys portfolio in anticipation of a future price-shock than
someone who is negligent. If the price shock is truly an ex-post surprise however, the CEOs
ex-ante e¤ort makes little di¤erence. By projecting information, board members will act as
the CEO could have anticipated the shock and reward him for good luck and punish him for
bad luck.
Football coaches are routinely red after a bad season, but there is no clear evidence how
much coaching skill actually matters. If principals project skill intensive ex-post information,
they will exaggerate the role of talent in determining performance. Successful coaches, exec-
utives or politicians will be relatively over-valued and failed ones relatively under-valued.10
Under-inference In some professional settings, success itself is the creation of easy-to-
understand information. This information may well have the same content as an ex-ante
already existing piece, but can be successfully processed by a much broader set of types.
The prime example is that of a simple mathematical proof or a commercial invention. By
projecting information, observers here fail to recognize how hard the original problem was
ex-ante, and underappreciate the skill-content of a successful solution.
A clear application is patent law. Legal professionals will fail to appreciate how non-
obvious an invention was ex-ante and will grant too few patents. Mandel (2006) argues 
in what he calls patently obvious"  that this is a signicant problem in patent law and
provides supportive experimental evidence. 11
4.3 The Supply of Information
Lets now turn to the key result of the paper, the agency conict caused by the fear of
average underestimation. As mentioned before, evidence suggests that medical and legal
professionals do fear biased evaluations. To understand the consequences of such a fear, let
me turn to the optimal response of experts who anticipate biased evaluations.
Note rst that no matter whether the radiologist anticipates projection or not, he will
always want to o¤er the best diagnosis given his ex-ante information. This is true because
his utility is always higher after a success than after a failure.
Lemma 2 For all  (), the agents best-response is to maximize the ex-ante probability of
success.
Anticipation of biased monitoring a¤ects the radiologists preference over which medical
cases to undertake. The more valuable the ex-post medical information is, the worse reputa-
10Although the nature of the projected information is not controlled for, eld evidence is consistent with
systematic over-inference. Jenter and Kanaan (2011) nd that boards do not lter out economic shocks from
the evaluation of CEOs, and Wolfers (2007) provides similar evidence on the re-election of politicians following
unanticipated price shocks.
11Here whether assessments after a failure here are too low or two high, depends on the two countervailing
forces, under-estimation and under-inference.
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tional prospect he faces. The best way to capture his strategic response is then to consider
his preference over the ex-ante information contained in the case.
Suppose the radiologist has no direct choice over what medical cases to accept, but has
discretion over what ex-ante information to order. In particular, he can decide whether to
order, on top of s0, an additional ex-ante radiograph, s00. The social value of producing
s00 is given by some value a 2 R. Benets of production include the additional knowledge
gained, while costs include the alternative use of medical resources, the delay in treatment,
and increased pain or radiation. The radiologist privately observes a and publicly decides to
produce s00 before taking action ya. As standard in models of career concerns, e.g., Harris
and Holmström (1982), I assume that when making this decision the radiologist faces the
same uncertainty about his skill as the evaluator.12
To assume away all direct agency conicts, I consider the case where the radiologist fully
internalizes a and is risk-neutral over assessments 1. I relax both assumptions in Section 5.
The agents augmented objective is now:
u(y; a; !) = a+ b(1()) (5)
where  equals 1 if s00 is produced and 0 otherwise.
Letm be the ex-ante probability that the a full evaluation occurs after task completion. In
the Bayesian case, the agent produces s00 whenever it is socially optimal: there is a neutrality
between the task solved and the expected reputation. In contrast when assessments are biased
due to information projection, the same neutrality is violated. An agent best response is now
to over-produce tests that are substitutes of, and under-produce tests that are complements
of the information the evaluator independently learns ex-post.
Proposition 3 For all 0; s0,s1 the agents best response is given by a cut-o¤ strategy a(m; )
where s00 is produced if and only if a  a(;m). Furthermore,
1. For all  andm; a(0;m) = a(; 0) = 0:
2. If s00 and s1 are substitutes, a(;m) is increasing inm and  > 0:
3. If s00 and s1 are complements, a(;m) is decreasing in m and  > 0:
The above proposition implies that as the probability of monitoring increases, physicians
will increase the production of substitute tests and decrease the production of complement
tests. The common force driving these opposite responses is the desire to reduce the value
of the information gap g between the ex-ante and the ex-post stages.
Consider the case of substitute information. Suppose the radiologist can order an ad-
ditional MRI ex-ante and knows that independent of his production choice the content of
this MRI will become available to evaluators ex-post. Whenever the marginal value of the
ex-post information is lower once one knows the outcome of the ex-ante MRI, the radiologist
has an additional incentive to produce this MRI. Physicians who fear information projection
will take too many biopsies, expose patients to too much radiation, or recommend surgery
12The qualitative results of Proposition 3 will continue to hold when the amount of inference about  is held
constant and the radiologist has superior information about his own type and can be extended to reputational
models with signalling.
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too often so that their ex-ante predictions appear less incompetent in hindsight. Similarly,
engineers might delay projects to collect information even if they know that the marginal
value of this information is much lower than the additional cost of the delay.
The opposite happens when the result of an ex-ante test complements ex-post informa-
tion. A physician who fears information projection avoids ordering complement information
ex-ante. A noisy mammogram is often the best way to detect breast cancer at an early stage.
Once the location of the tumor is known ex-post, an evaluator can easily determine whether
a tumor was already developing ex-ante. Such ex-post insight is often impossible without the
ex-ante mammogram. Ironically, the radiologist appears less incompetent on average if he
does not order the mammogram ex-ante. In this fashion, doctors will be reluctant to order
vague radiological charts, therapists will be reluctant to keep transcripts, social workers will
be reluctant to make ambiguous phone calls, and engineers will be reluctant to keep equiv-
ocal forecasts of catastrophes, because in hindsight evaluators will interpret these as clean
ex-ante evidence.
The above proposition implies that as the liability pressure on physicians increases it is the
composition of the ex-ante information that changes. Whenever defensive practices cannot
fully eliminate underestimation, the model makes the following joint prediction: as liability
pressure rises, the reputation of the average physician drops and the medicine practiced
becomes less e¢ cient.13 This joint prediction identies the agency problem.
Proposition 3 is stated for the case where evaluators observe a binary outcome variable,
but the same qualitative result holds with the generality of Theorem 1. This is true because
if the conditions of Theorem 1 are satised, then from the fact that an increase in the
information gap between the radiologist and the evaluator leads to a decrease in the expected
reputational lottery in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance it follows that the
radiologist wants to distort the production of information in the exact same ways. An
additional ex-ante substitute signal increases and an additional complement signal decreases
the reputational lottery.
4.4 Defensive Medicine
The agency conict described above is consistent with evidence on defensive medicine de-
scribed as procedures designed to minimize false liability rather than maximize cost-e¤ective
health care.Leonard Berlins (2003) testimony to the US Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation Labor and Pensions illustrates the potential scope of information projection in radiol-
ogy. Based on empirical studies conducted in prestigious US medical institutions, he argues
that in hindsight as many as many as 90% of lung cancers and 70% of breast cancers can be
observed on radiographs previously read as normal.14
The study of Studdert et al. (2005) documents widespread defensive practices consistent
with those described by Proposition 3. Studdert et al. (2005) interviewed physicians in
13The latter could though need not  translate to both higher costs (substitute info) and lower quality
(complement info).
14Berlin, L. (2003), Statement of Leonard Berlin, M.D. To the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Ed-
ucation Labor and Pensions Re: Mammography Quality Standards Act Reauthorization. April 8, 2003.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/brieng/3945b1_05_Berlin%20testimony.pdf
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high-risk elds in Pennsylvania. Of the 824 physicians interviewed, 93% engaged in defen-
sive medicine involving both in assuranceand avoidancebehavior which correspond to the
over- and under-production of medical tests. 90% of physicians reported ordering medically
unwarranted diagnostic tests. The most common responses also included frequently avoid-
ing the most e¢ cient medical test. As an example, 36% of radiologists reported ordering
unnecessary MRIs and 54% of radiologist reported that they often avoid ordering medically
e¢ cient mammograms.
Supporting the setup of this paper, in the economics literature, Kessler and Mclellan
(1996) argue that the primary motivation for defensive medicine is not incomplete monetary
insurance but the fear of reputational loss.15 Consistent with the models prediction, Kessler
and Mclellan (1996) use data from elderly heart patients to show that reducing liability
pressure signicantly reduces medical expenditures without increasing mortality or medical
complications. Kessler and McClellan (2002) also nd that the main e¤ect of cost reduction
is on diagnostic rather than on therapeutic practices, which also supports the mechanism of
information projection since there is likely to be room for greater information projection in
diagnostic practices.
Defensive practices are sometimes attributed to physiciansfear of random judicial judge-
ments. This statement alone has little explanatory or predictive power. If the cause of false
liability however, is not random judgment, but fear that evaluators exaggerate the ex-ante
accuracy of tests, as argued for example by Berlin and Hendrix (1998) or Berlin (2004),
increased e¢ ciency should operate through an observable and systematic change in the com-
position of the diagnostic practices as specied by the above result.
Proposition 3 can equivalently be expressed in the context of ex-ante choice of medical
procedures or physicianstiming of medical tests. The under-production of complement tests
then has an implication to the problem of preventive medicine. Physicians in my model will
be reluctant to order early tests - especially if these will be accessible by evaluators ex-post
because in most scenarios looking at such radiographs once an illness has developed much
later will allow evaluators to detect early signsof the illness too easily.
5 Discussion and Repairs
Proposition 3 is the key behavioral prediction of the model. It describes an agency conict
which does not exist under Bayesian assumptions. In this Section, I rst demonstrate the
robustness of this result and argue that instruments which correct for agency conicts that
arise due to agents risk-aversion or because agents do not internalize the costs or benets of
information production are either ine¤ective or exacerbate defensive practices. I then turn to
possible repairs and show how particular performance-sampling rules can mitigate defensive
practices while not distorting Bayesian incentives.
15Kessler and McClellan (1996) argue that since virtually all physicians in their sample are fully insured
against the nancial costs of malpractice (damages, legal expenses etc.) physicians "may employ costly
precautionary treatments in order to avoid nonnancial penalties such as fear of reputational harm, decreased
self-esteem from adverse publicityetc.
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5.1 Extensions
Let me now demonstrate the robustness of Proposition 3 by allowing for (i) agents who are
risk-averse, (ii) agents who do not fully internalize the cost or benet of production, and (iii)
production where s00 can be hidden from the evaluator.
Risk Aversion So far, I assumed that the radiologist was risk-neutral over assess-
ments. The same qualitative results hold under risk-aversion. This is true because informa-
tion projection a¤ects the mean rather than the spread of the reputational lottery. In fact,
risk-aversion typically amplies defensive practices. As noted before, (Holmström, 1982),
under correct expectations, risk averse agents have a preference for limiting the production
of all skill-intensive information to prevent evaluators updating their beliefs.16 In contrast,
a risk-averse radiologist who fears underestimation will display di¤erential responses. She
would want to over-produce skill-intensive substitute information. Hence, production ine¢ -
ciency arises independent of the problem of optimal risk-sharing, the same directional e¤ects
hold even when the amount of inference about the radiologists skill  the spread of the
reputational lottery is held constant.
Incentives A moral hazard problem arises when radiologists do not fully internalize the
costs or the benets of producing s00 and calls for stronger or weaker production incentives.
A tax on production or a bonus after a success can correct for distortions in the volume, but
not in the composition of the information produced ex-ante. A radiologist who is monitored
by biased evaluators still enjoys a higher reputation if he distorts production in the manner
described above.
Similarly, even if a third-party who was aware of the evaluators bias, such as a principal,
inated or deated the evaluators assessments, this would not limit defensive practices.
Suppose the principal decided to inate the evaluators ex-post assessment 1 by shifting
this distribution upwardsin the sense of rst-order dominance (for example such that in
expectations it equaled 0). Since by distorting the ex-ante production of information, the
radiologist can still a¤ect the level of 1 in the same way as before, his defensive incentives
are unchanged. For any xed ination or deation policy, the radiologist would still want to
distort the ex-ante composition of tests as described by Proposition 3. Di¤erential incentives
for the production of substitute and complement information would be required to reduce
defensive medicine.
Observability Finally, I also assumed above that if a signal was produced ex-ante,
the evaluator observed this. If the expert could produce s00 secretly, that is, in a way that
the evaluator believed s00 was not produced, then the expert would want to produce this
signal too often, independent of whether it is a substitute or a complement of s1. Such
over-production is not specic to the biased case. Secret production of information has the
additional benet of raising reputations even when evaluators do not project information:
it fools the evaluator into believing that the expert has solved a harder problem than he
actually did.
16On this point see also Hermalin (1993).
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5.2 Performance Sampling
Under Bayesian assumptions, ex-post information helps the evaluator form better estimates
of . In the biased case, ex-post information leads to biased beliefs and a costly agency
conict. Maintaining observability but suppressing ex-post information from monitoring is
typically not a viable strategy. The observation of an outcome typically cannot be separated
from the observation of novel information about the task. The only possibility is to selectively
suppress outcome information.
Consider the same setup as before, but emphasize more explicitly that the agent com-
pletes a sequence of independent tasks. Evaluators then need to sample from this sequence.
Furthermore, the sample need not be balanced: successful cases may knowingly be over-
sampled and failed ones under-sampled. For example, in deciding on the promotion of a
police o¢ cer, his superiors might devote more careful attention to cases where the o¢ cer
identied the o¤ender quickly than to cases where his e¤orts produced no timely results. In
academia or industry research, promotion committees might only sample projects that led
to decent inventions and have no detailed access to projects where the candidate ended up
wasting resources.
To be more specic, let me dene a performance sampling rule. The denition below is
clearly a limit case of a more realistic scenario where observability varies more smoothly.
Denition 3 A sampling rule is a probability pair (mf ;ms) such that given a task the eval-
uator observes (S0,s1,x) with probability mf if the outcome is a failure and probability ms if
the outcome is a success. In the remaining cases, the evaluator only observes the structure
of S0.
A performance sample allows for meaningful inference if the evaluator knows the sampling
rule. Suppose that the sampling rule is common knowledge. Evaluators can then always
infer the true success/failure ratio from the observed sample. Hence, in the Bayesian case
the specication of the sampling rule has no e¤ect on expected reputations. Agents here
have no reason to distort information production.
Lemma 3 If  = 0, then a(m; 0) = 0 for all ms,mf :
Consider now the biased case. The fact that (mf ;ms) is common knowledge no longer
guarantees e¢ cient production. Instead, the specication of the sampling rule directly a¤ects
production. This follow from the fact that observers receive relevant ex-post information only
if a case is sampled. By selecting a sampling rule (mf ;ms) a designer can inuence whether
evaluators are exposed to ex-post information more often after a failure or after a success.
Since conditional assessments are not necessarily biased in the same direction after a success
and a failure, an increase in ms versus an increase in mf might a¤ect defensive practices in
di¤erent ways.17
17A separate issue from the one discussed in the text is when evaluators are fooled about the sample. In the
agency setup fooling will not solve the problem. Suppose evaluators have wrong beliefs about (ms;mf ): This
would obviously a¤ect the level of the radiologists reputations, but as argued in the beginning of this Section,
such ination or deation of reputations will not a¤ect the incentives for defensive practices qualitatively. It
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The analysis of how the exact choice of the sampling rule a¤ects production is complicated
by the presence of over- and under-inference as described by Proposition 2. To simplify
matters, lets rst focus on the case where these forces are not present and thus information
projection leads only to underestimation. Assume also that simply inferring the outcome of
a case provides no additional information about the state. Then investigating the reasons
for successful performance but never for failures will eliminate the incentives for defensive
practices entirely.
Proposition 4 Suppose g is constant in  for all s0: The cut-o¤ a(m; ) is constant in ms.
1. If s00 and s1 are substitutes, a(;m) is decreasing in mf and  > 0:
2. If s00 and s1 are complements, a(;m) is increasing in mf and  > 0:
3. For all  > 0, a(m; ) = 0 if and only if ms  0 and mf = 0.
Suppose that by projecting information evaluators exaggerate each types productivity
by the same factor. Information projection here only distorts assessments after a failure 
Proposition 2. If evaluators only sample cases where the expert succeeded, they only observe
the ex-post information after a success. Of course from the number of successful cases she
observes, the evaluator infers the radiologists rate of failure, but when thinking about those
failed cases she is constraint to adopt the ex-ante perspective. This eliminates the distortion
due to information projection and guarantees that the ex-ante expected reputation and
production incentives of the expert are unbiased.
The same qualitative insight holds more generally. A su¢ cient condition can be expressed
as a general complementarity relation between skill and ex-post information: the greater is
the average additional value of the ex-post information the more it increases the productiv-
ity of high types relative to low types. Under such conditions the incentives for defensive
practices are again best reduced when the probability that a successful case is reviewed is
higher than the probability that a failed case is reviewed. Let g0 denote the type-dependent
information gap when s00 is also produced and g denote the same when s00 is not produced.
Proposition 5 Suppose g is constant and (g0   g)@g
0

 > 0. Then for all  > 0, a(m; )
is decreasing in ms and increasing in mf and there exists ms() > mf () > 0 such that
a(m(); ) = 0.
Organizational Repairs. Selectively suppressing information can achieve three goals
simultaneously: (i) allow for some inference about the quality of the expert, (ii) leave
Bayesian production incentives una¤ected, and (iii) improve production e¢ ciency in the
biased case. Doing so involves a departure from organizational practices that would be op-
timal under Bayesian assumptions. Consider rst the case where resource constrains on
monitoring are non-binding. Here, in the unbiased case, a promotion committee would want
to review all medical cases. In the presence of information projection  or experts fear
thereof a promotion committee shall instead review only a limited sample. The focus of
would simply shift a(m; ) up or down, but will not change the comparative statics.
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monitoring could also change as organizations become more concerned about information
projection. Suppose resource constraints on monitoring are binding. Learning about the
causes of failures could be more informative under Bayesian assumptions because this may
allow for a better separation of low and high types. The above results imply that the pres-
ence of information projection may shift the optimal allocation of monitoring resources from
investigating failures to investigating successes. Future research can address these issues in
more detail.
6 Communication
I now turn to a brief application of the model to the problem of communication. The
main prediction here is that privately informed speakers will assume too much knowledge
on behalf of their listeners. A biased speaker will fail to tailor her message to the actual
background knowledge of her listener, and upon observing that as a result the listener acts
more confused, she will infer that he is dumb, inattentive or unable to execute.
Computer manuals or interfaces that are ideal for engineers are too technical for the
average user. The value of a message is determined not only by its content, but also by its
relation to what the audience knows to begin with. Describing information in a way which
builds on the existing knowledge of listeners is key for e¢ cient communication.
To understand the impact of projection bias on communication in the presence of such
complementarity, I focus on the simplest coordination problem where a sender and a receiver
have perfectly aligned interests. The sender sends a message ys, the receiver responds with
an action yr. The receivers objective is to match the true state ! as often as possible.
Suppose the true state ! is decomposable into $1; $2 2 f 1; 1g the following way
! = $1 $2
There are three signals: s1 = $1 the technical language, s2 = $2 the technical term,
and s3 a noisy lay description.The sender knows both s1 and s2. These two pieces of
information are perfect complements: one conveys information if and only if the other is also
known. The lay description is an imperfect substitute of these two, and is given by s3 such
that Pr(s3 = ! j !) = h < 1:
The notion of a technical term is simple: the correct interpretation of most medical,
technological or mathematical terms requires extensive prior knowledge of the relevant eld.
To illustrate how this di¤ers from a lay description, suppose communication takes place under
binding time constraints. It takes much more time to e¤ectively convey the meaning of a
medical diagnosis or an engineering idea to a layperson than to a trained doctor or engineer.
Hence, when time is binding, the lay description ultimately conveys less information and
thus can be modeled as less precise (needing to ignore important details), and hence allows
the listener to identify the truth less often.18
18Alternatively, the results below can be re-phrased as a speakers decision on how much time to allocate
to communication.
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Suppose that communicating the technical language is prohibitively time-consuming. The
sender thus faces three options: (i) send s2, (ii) send s3, or (iii) remain silent. The cost of
sending a message is c, and silence is free.19 Suppose that there is a symmetric prior on $1
and $2:The table below summarizes a -biased speakers perception of the probability of a
correct choice by the receiver for each of the messages:
silence technical term lay term
1
2 +
2
2
1
2 +

2 h+ (1  h)2
The proposition below summarizes a biased persons communication strategy. Let  =
(h  12)=(1  h).
Proposition 6 If  < , the speaker sends s3 if (1   2)(h   12) > c; and stays silent
otherwise. If  > , the advisor sends s2 if 12(  2) > c ; and stays silent otherwise.
Consistent with earlier intuitions, biased experts send messages that are too di¢ cult for
lay people to understand. Relative to the unbiased case, information projection distorts
communicational e¢ ciency in two specic ways: experts speak too rarely, and when they
speak, they send messages that are too technical. The above proposition shows that overall
a biased speaker under-communicates information that substitutes for her expertise (s3) and
over-communicates information that complements it (s2).
It is easy to see, following Theorem 1, that if the speaker makes inferences about the
attentiveness or his ability to utilize information by observing yr, she will be too surprise
how often the listeners action misses the true state. The above result illustrates that the
option to send a technical term, because it wrongly increases the speakers belief of how
much information can be transmitted, exacerbates such underestimation.
This above result is consistent with the evidence on the misattribution of the causes
of communication failures, as mentioned in Section 2. The following story collected by
Cusumano and Selby (1995) illustrates the above mechanism:
At one point, Microsoft started surveying users to see how many of them
found it easy to use a particular feature. Software developers often refused to
believe the statistics. The usability group would tell the development group Six
out of ten couldnt do this. And the developers reaction would be, Whered
you nd six dumb people?The usual nonsense answer Well, they can just look
in the manual if they dont know how to use it,or My idea is brilliant; you just
found ten stupid people.
Favoritism and Protocols The presence of information projection provides a rationale
why communication protocols can improve e¢ ciency. Importantly though, even in our simple
example, mandating communication need not restore e¢ ciency. In fact, when  > , such
a policy will backre. Here banning silence will only increase expertsnegative attributions
about listeners. Instead, protocols that restrict the use of messages which complement the
19To simplify the analysis, I assume that the speaker knows the properties of s3, but not its realization.
The insights easily extend to the case where this assumption is relaxed.
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speakers background, but encourage the use of messages which substitute for it are necessary
to restore e¢ cient information transmission.
A close analogue of communication protocols is proof-reading. The above result im-
plies that the best people to judge the appropriateness of a text-book or a doctor-patient
communication-protocol are not fellow experts, but people with less expertise.
Communication protocols can also help reduce favoritism in the workplace. Since in their
interactions with employees supervisors misattribute di¤erences in information to di¤erences
in skill, workers such as immigrants who do not share the linguistic background of the
supervisor will su¤er relative to workers who do. This might prompt skilled immigrants to
choose less productive self-employment, such as opening a restaurant, rather than joining a
corporate hierarchy. 20
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The presence of hindsight bias, curse-of-knowledge and the illusion of transparency in human
judgement illustrates a general mistake in information processing in the interpersonal context.
I termed this mistake information projection. The aim of this paper has been to enrich
the economic analysis of situations with asymmetric information by introducing a widely-
applicable model of this information projection capturing a broad class of mispredictions in
a parsimonious manner. Applications to agency and communication settings demonstrated
the relevance of the model for economics.
The key application of the model introduced a novel form of agency conict which does not
exist under Bayesian assumptions. In this context, the model provided a unied explanation
of the types of assurance and avoidance behavior that medical observers have long attributed
to defensive practices rather than cost-e¤ective health care. To protect their reputation,
fully concerned and risk-neutral workers under-produced ex-ante tests that complemented
the information evaluators independently learned ex-post, and over-produced skill-intensive
ex-ante tests that substituted for the same information.
Various tests can help identify the model. The results on belief-updating allow for
tests in dynamic inference problems. Information projection can be tested on disaggregated
choice data such as combining choices over information sets and choices over outcomes, (e.g.,
Camerer, 1992 or Loewenstein et al., 2006). Such designs also allow to further understand
the extents to which people are sophisticated about their own tendency as well as the ten-
dency of others to project information. Non-standard comparative static results of the paper,
such as the impact of monitoring on the value of agency relationships, can help identify the
presence and signicance of information projection in economic data more generally.
An important limitation of my approach should be noted when testing the model. As
many economic models, my model allows for heterogeneity in information projection, but it
does not pin down such heterogeneity. Certain pieces of information can and are projected
to a greater extent than others, but the model is limited by the fact that without additional
20Madarasz (2009) briey discusses the a¤ect of information projection on listeners understaning of mes-
sages, and argues that biased listeners fail to rely on their own private information su¢ ciently and hence will
follow herds too often.
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data, it cannot predict heterogeneity in a systematic manner. The key implications of the
model and the results do not depend on the nature of such heterogeneity, but the model here
provides a framework in which such heterogeneity can be established empirically and where
various more ad hoc measures of informational mispredictions can be integrated.21
Information projection is likely to matter in agency problems and organizational settings
not covered in this paper. Madarász (2009) contains an example where the model is applied
to a problem with moral hazard. In a setting with limited liability and explicit contracting,
information projection transforms a de jure negligence rule to de facto strict liability. Finer
monitoring and steeper incentives can backre and induce physicians to exert less care.
Optimal monitoring is coarser and incentives are weaker than under Bayesian assumptions.
Empirical applications of the model could also help us understand anomalous evidence on
CEO turnover, (Jenter and Kanaan, 2011), politician turnover (Wolfers, 2007), or unintended
favoritism. Future work can also address optimal contracting problems in the presence of
biased evaluations more generally.
The model applies to various other social inference problems. The dinner example of
Section 3 can directly be extended into a more powerful analysis of social conict. People
in many natural learning environments people will mistakenly attribute taste di¤erences
to di¤erences in social intentions, leading to segregation and false perceptions of hostility.
Interventions that re-shape the structure of learning could x broken links, and greatly reduce
false conict. Further lab and eld evidence could also help test these predictions.
Although the paper focused on interpersonal information projection, it is possible to
extend the model to the intrapersonal domain. For example, when considering a persons
own future selves, the model predicts that people will be overcondent about their prospective
memory for those pieces of information that they currently know, but less so for information
they know they will learn in the future. Exploring this link can shed new light on various
puzzles in intertemporal choice, and provide novel predictions on the role of deadlines and
reminders in mitigating self-control problems.
Finally, one possible theory of the source of information projection is limited perspective-
taking, as discussed by Piaget and Inhelder (1967). In line with this interpretation, one can
extend the model to consider the problem of ignorance projection, where people underesti-
mate the probability with which signals whose realizations they do not know, are unavailable
to others.22 In the context of Bayesian games, Madarász (2011) develops a unied model of
information and ignorance projection.
8 Appendix
Below, I rst demonstrated that the incomplete model of anchored expectations employed by
CLW (1989) generically violates information projection. I then turn to the proofs. Distrib-
utions and random variables below depend on the underlying state !. To save on notation
21See e.g., Pohl et al (1993).
22 Ignorance projection is unlikely to play a signicant role in the contexts studied in this paper but it might
be relevant in other economic contexts. The experimental paradigms of Fischho¤ (1975), Newton (1990) and
CLW (1989) do not allow to test for ignorance projection.
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whenever ! is suppressed, I mean the expected distribution of the relevant variable after
taking the expectations with respect to (!).
Projection versus Anchored Expectations CLW (1989) o¤er an anchoring-based
explanation of the curse of knowledge. There a strictly better informed Tanya perceives the
mean expectation of a strictly lesser informed Alex to be the convex combination of her
mean expectation and Alexs true mean expectation. This approach leaves other moments
of Tanyas belief unspecied and does not address the case where information is not strictly
ordered.
Let me now briey show that generically the two approaches contradict each other. This
fact is based on the observation that the exaggeration of the proximity of two means is not
a measure of informational closeness. Thus anchored expectations imply neither that Tanya
overestimates nor that she underestimates of the value of Alexs information. No-matter
how one completed this anchoring-based account, anchored expectations violate information
projection and vice versa.
Consider a numerical example, where Let there are three people with strictly ordered
information about the return on an asset. 1. Alex is uninformed and has a uniform prior
over [0; 1]: 2. Gremin is better informed and receives valuable information by learning that
the return is either 0 or 34 with equal probability. 3. Tanya learns that the true return is
3
4 :
The distance between Tanyas and the least informed Alexs mean belief is 14 : The distance
between the Gremins and Tanyas mean beliefs is larger 38 .
Proof of Lemma 1. Let the belief over 
 induced by the information set Si be i. Anal-
ogously, let the belief induced by Si [ Sk be i+k. Since both 
 and Z are nite, i and
i+k are also nite. We can collect the realizations of these posteriors as a function of the
state-dependent signal realizations into matrices i and i+k respectively. By the law of
iterated expectations, E[i+k j Si] = i for all Ii and Ik. This implies that there exists
a non-negative matrix with columns summing up to 1; i.e., a Markov matrix, T such that
i = Ti+k: From the classic theorem of Blackwell (1953) on comparison of information sets
it follows that for any xed von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function, ui(y; !), given a
nite action set Y , maxyi ui(yi; ! j Si)  maxyi ui(yi; ! j Sk [ Si):
Person ks Bayesian and fully biased perception of i0s information are given by p0i and p
1
i .
Both of these are probability distributions over N, and one can obtain p1i from p0i by allocating
probabilistic weights from Blackwell less informative to Balckwell more informative signal
sets, given the above observation. It then follows from the above observation that 1(ui ) rst-
order stochastically dominates 0(ui ). Since 
(ui ) is a probabilistic mixture of 
1(ui ) and
0(ui ), the same is true whenever comparing 
0 > . Finally, projecting a more informative
information set S0 instead of S means shifting probabilistic weight to information sets with
even greater expected utility.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let X denote the cardinality of the outcome space and let us index
the elements of X by l in ascending order. Below, I suppress the term u in the notation
because it appears in all relevant terms.
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By the law of conditional probability when  = 0, Ex[01( j x)] = 0(). Consider the
case when  > 0; the expected belief of a -biased observer that  = b is:
Ex

1(
b) =PXl=1[((xl j b)0(b)E(xl) )E(xl)] (6)
which one can re-write as:
Ex

1(
b) = 0(b)
(b)z }| {
XP
l=1
(xl j b) E(xl)
E(xl)
(7)
The term (b) expresses the weight attached to type b: In the Bayesian case, (b) = 1
for all b, a result known as the martingale property of Bayesian beliefs. Below I show that if
 > 0, the function (b) is decreasing in b. Hence low values of  are overweighted relative
to high values which implies that the biased posterior is below the Bayesian posterior in the
sense of fosd.
1. Given the MLRP of (x j ) in , it follows that for any l < X and b > 0,PLl=1f [(xl jb)  (xl j 0)] < 0.
2. Given the MLRP of (x j ) in u, E(xl)=E(xl) is decreasing in l for any  > 0.
3. Combining the above two facts, for any L < X; there exists Z > 1 such that
PL
l=1[
(xl j b)  (xl j 0)] E(xl)
E(xl)
= Z
PL
l=1[
(xl j b)  (xl j 0)] < 0 (8)
4. Using the same logic for xX , we have that (xX j b)   (xX j 0)  0 and that
E(xX)=E
(xX) < 1.
5. Given that Z > 1 > E(xX)=E(xX) it follows that
(b)  (0) =PXl=1[(xl j b)  (xl j 0)] E(xl)E(xl) < 0 (9)
because
PX
l=1
(xl j ) = 1 for any .
6. Given that () is decreasing in , for any prior 0() 2  and any  it follows
that: Z
<
()()d 
Z
<
()0()d (10)
thus Ex0( j x) rst order stochastically dominates Ex( j x) :
7. To show that the same relation holds for  < 0 note that 0(xl)(xl0) > (xl)
0
(xl0)
whenever xl > xl0 . Combined with the fact that (x j ) satises the MLRP in u the
proposition follows.
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8. To show that the same relation holds for g < g0 note that the same relation hold as in
the comparison of  < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that (xS j S0; ) satises the MLRP in  and in signal
additions to S0 for any S0. This is true because the probability of success is increasing in
type and in signal addition. Thus we can apply Theorem 1 for the case where X = 2:
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose g is increasing in : I rst show that for all  < 1 the
following inequality is satised:
E
(xS)
E(xS)

R 
0 
(xS j )0()dR 
0 
0(xS j )0()d
(11)
This is true because if for some  < 1 the inequality is violated, (xS j )=0(xS j )
would not be increasing contradicting our assumption: Using the fact that for any b,
1(
b j xS) = 0(b)(xS j b)
E(xS)
we can re-arrange Ineq. (11) and get thatZ 
0
1( j xS)d 
Z 
0
01( j xS)d (12)
The proof for the case when g is decreasing in  is analogous. Finally, if g is constant,
1( j xS) = 01( j xS) for all  and Bayesian and biased conditional beliefs after a success
are identical.
Proof of Proposition 3. To determine the incentives for production, we compare the
information gaps in the cases where s00 is produced and where it is not. Let the respective
quantities be g0 and g. I rst show that there is additional incentive to produce s00 i¤ g0 < g.
By setting a = 0, the agents decision to produce s00 is determined by whether the following
holds or not:
b(1(s
0
0))  b(1)  0
This inequality holds if 1(s
0
0) fosd 

1() which is true if g
0 < g.
If s00 and s1 are substitutes, then u(s00 [ s1) u(s00) < u(s1) u(;) which implies that
u(s00 [ s1)
u(s00)
  1 < u
(s1)
u(s00)
  u
(;)
u(s00)
<
u(s1)
u(;)  
u(;)
u(;)
and hence g0 < g. Similarly, if s00 and s1 are complements, then g0 > g. Thus the production
incentives are strictly positive if  > 0 and g0 > g, and strictly negative if g0 < g.
27
By the law of iterated expectations, a(0; 0) = 0 and by continuity, a(m; ) is decreasing
in m if g0 < g and increasing in m if g0 > g. Similarly since jg   g0j is increasing in , a(m; )
is increasing in  if s00 and s1 are complements and decreasing in  if they are substitutes.
Proof of Lemma 2. Follows from the law of iterated expectations.
Proof of Proposition 4. I suppress s0 in the notation below. The expected -biased
posterior depends both on the success probability and the monitoring frequencies. Given a
xed (mf ;ms), if s00 is not produced, we have that Ex

1() equals
E(xS)[mS

1( j xS) + (1 mS)1( j xS)] +
(1  E(xS))[mF1( j xF ) + (1 mF )1( j xF )]
An analogous expression holds where s00 is also produced.
If g is constant, 

1( j xS ; s1) = 1( j xS) and hence mF = 0 implies that -biased
expected assessments equal the prior, i.e., a(m; ) is constant in mS . Since 

1( j xF )
is decreasing in g, a(m; ) is increasing in mF if g0 > g and decreasing if g0 < g. As a
consequence, a(m; ) = 0 for all  > 0 i¤mS  0 and mF = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. We need to specify conditions on (mS ;mF ) such that expected
assessments are independent of production. For the expected assessments across the two
production scenarios to equal, the following condition must be met:
mF [

1()  1( j s00)] = E(xS j s00)[mS  mF ][1( j xS ; s00)  1( j xS ; s00)]
To derive the above result, I used the fact that if s00 is not produced, 

1( j xS) = 1( j
xS) for all . From the fact that (g0   g)@g
0

 > 0 it follows that the LHS and the RHS
of the above equation have the same signs i¤ mS > mF . Furthermore, if mS > mF , then
mF =(mS mF ) 2 [0;1) and there always exist mS() > mF () such that the above equality
holds. The comparative statics follow from the earlier discussions.
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